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Objective: To determine if a general ward-based plan to address the deteriorating patient could improve RRS
utilization over and above a mandatory organizational policy and procedure.
Design: A two stage methodology: First, engagement with ward providers and users of the RRS to generate ward-based
interventions; Second, measurement of the incidence of missed/delayed RRS calls, RRS calls, cardiac arrests and unplanned
intensive care unit admission both prior to the intervention and 12 months post implementation.
Setting: Monash Health is a comprehensive healthcare network with 570 adult in-patient beds across four metropolitan
teaching hospitals in the south-eastern sector of Melbourne.
Results: The interventions selected for intervention were: (1) a ward based agreement on how to best locally optimize
management of the deteriorating patient,(2) an improved communication protocol, and (3) a revision of the education
program for staff. Post intervention the aggregate rate of missed/delayed RRS calls reduced across all wards (1.05 to 0.34
per 1000 bed days, p = 0.049). This occurred without a change in the rate of RRS activation (7.98 per 1000 bed days
pre-intervention versus 7.85 bed days post-intervention). The incidence of cardiac arrests or unplanned interventions did
not change post intervention.
Conclusions: Engagement of the users of a system like the RRS activation protocol can improve compliance rates with
protocols when the users have ownership of the process.
Keywords: Rapid Response Systems (RRS), Medical Emergency Team (MET), Patient safety, Cardiac arrest, Hospital cultureBackground
Regardless of the debate over the efficacy of the RRS,
they have been widely adopted [1]. However for the RRS
to be effective it needs to be utilized appropriately [2,3].
In 2007 the Quality and Safety unit in our organization
identified eleven sentinel cases where significant patient
harm occurred in association with the failure of bedside
staff to activate the RRS. Attempts to rationalize and
pattern match the underlying features of our incidents
using clinical reviews and root cause analyses were un-
successful. There appeared to be no obvious cause in
terms of poor staff training, lack of motivation or* Correspondence: Michael.Buist@utas.edu.au
1The Centre for health Services Research, School of Medicine University of
Tasmania, Private Bag 3513, Burnie, Tasmania 7320, Australia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2015 Buist et al.; licensee BioMed Central. T
Commons Attribution License (http://creativec
reproduction in any medium, provided the or
Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.or
unless otherwise stated.understanding of the patients’ clinical states; the usual
factors noted in the literature [4-9].
To better understand this problem, we previously
undertook a study to determine the incidence and fac-
tors behind the phenomenon of not activating the RRS
[10,11]. In the point prevalence part of this study [10],
undertaken over a 24 hour period, we found an inci-
dence of failure to activate the RRS of 42%. The reasons
we found for failure to activate the RRS were predomin-
antly socio-cultural factors amongst the bedside ward
clinical staff; namely a sense that the clinical situation
was under control, that the critical care team had
already reviewed the patient, and that the bedside treat-
ing team had enough experience to manage the situ-
ation. We concluded that the failure to activate the RRS
was not because of failure to appropriately recognizehis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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a face validity problem with activation of the RRS. For
example, in this study [10] there was only one Intensive
Care Unit (ICU) admission from all the patients who did
not appropriately get a RRS response. The remainder of
the patients did not need any significant clinical inter-
vention. However, this one patient needed prolonged
multi-organ support and several reoperations. What we
found is that ward clinical staff interpret the RRS activa-
tion criteria against the clinical context and their own
clinical ward or unit socio cultural practice beliefs. From
that study we could see that most of the time the ward
clinical staff were correct in their assumptions about the
trajectory of the patient outcomes. On the one occasion
that they erred there was significant cost to both the pa-
tient and the organization. In essence, both the sensitiv-
ity and specificity of commonly utilized RRS activation
criteria are too low to significantly change ward staff be-
liefs about the RRS [12-15].
To improve the management and outcome of deterior-
ating patients in our organization we decided to try a
different approach to our traditional top down policy
and procedure for mandatory RRS activation. Instead,
we developed a socio-cultural intervention with the staff
in the general wards. The aim of this study was to deter-
mine the effectiveness of that intervention to improve
the utilization of RRS to prevent such sentinel events. In
essence what we wanted was the right patient getting
the RRS response and also not having the RRS attend
calls on patients where no interventions were required. To
do this we wanted to blend the organization’s mandatory
RRS activation policy with some of those unwritten ward




The Monash Health research and ethics committee
exempted this study from requiring ethics approval as it
fulfilled the NHMRC criteria for a quality assurance
project.
Setting
Monash Health is a comprehensive university tertiary
health care provider for the south-eastern suburbs of
Melbourne. Over 13,000 staff service a catchment popu-
lation of 880,000 and provide acute health services at
four hospital sites. All acute services are provided with
the exception of burns, spinal injury, and major organ
transplantation. Monash Health was an early and enthu-
siastic adopter of the RRS with establishment of the
Medical Emergency Team (MET) in one of our hospitals
in 1996. This resulted in substantial and significant im-
provements in patient outcome within our hospitals[16,17] and this system of care was standardized
throughout the organization by 2006. Additionally our
organization committed to training all junior members
of clinical staff and MET responders in the purpose built
simulation centre [18].
Intervention wards
Six sample wards were selected (Table 1) that repre-
sented a mix of surgical and medical patients, and wards
where from our previous study the incidence of end
points (cardiac arrest, ICU/HDU admission, and unex-
pected death) were in the middle range [10,11].
Study design
There were two parts to this study. (a) First, a process of
engagement of actual users of the RRS to select interven-
tions that may improve utilisation of the RRS. (b) Second,
testing of these interventions in the selected wards .
(a) Selection of interventions
Twenty-four participants were selected who represented
users of the RRS. These included junior and senior clini-
cians who may activate the RRS in the clinical areas and
staff attending as part of the RRS such as ICU nurses.
These participants attended a one day workshop with the
aim of selecting up to three interventions to trial in the six
study wards. This selection process was facilitated by the
presentation of results from our previous work that docu-
mented failure of RRS activation. To assist with the selec-
tion of the interventions, participants were asked to focus
on four issues with the current RRS.
Current RRS issues/questions 1. How can RRS calls be
sensitive to all the different clinical areas? 2. How can we
prevent prolonged delays in RRS activation? 3. How can
we make RRS activation criteria more visible to staff? 4.
How can we make sure that the treating (parent) clinical
team continue to have responsibility for the patient.
From the socio-cultural intervention workshop day, the
24 users of the RRS put 60 proposals forward about how
the process could be improved. Suggestions that were du-
plicated or clearly unworkable due to extreme cost were
excluded. The authors then rated the remaining 14 pro-
posals for 5 criteria (effectiveness, acceptability, feasibility,
cost and sustainability) using a score of 1 to 5 for each cri-
teria in each proposal. After this, a further two proposals
were excluded. The first being the use of colour coded
charts on the basis of proposed national implementation
by the Australian Commission on Quality and Safety [19].
The second was the simulation-based education program
for nurses and doctors about the RRS in our organization
as this was a suggestion that had been implemented
already [18]. At the conclusion of this process, three pro-
posals adopted for intervention in the six wards:
Table 1 Clinical and Demographic characteristics of the pilot wards (n = 6)






1 (34 N) Monash Medical Centre Surgery (Renal and Vascular) Both 26 91%
2 (44S) Monash Medical Centre Medical (General Medicine) Acute 28 92%
3 (Ward A) Casey Hospital Both (General Medicine and Surgery) Both 27 54%
4 (Surgical Unit 1) Dandenong Hospital Both (Gastroenterology and general surgery) Acute 28 96%
5 (West 4) Dandenong Hospital Medical (Respiratory Medicine) Both 36 99%
6 (Ward 3) Moorabbin Hospital Surgery (ENT, Urology and Orthopaedics Elective 25 74%
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of the RRS (Figure 1). The idea of individual
agreements was born out of the realization that
health professionals in specialized clinical areas
often considered themselves experts in a particular
mode of deterioration. For example, an abnormal
heart rate may be more appropriately managed in
an area of predominantly cardiology patients than
on a neurology ward. The staff on each unit were
given clear boundaries of clinical freedom to work
within, depending on their individualized
agreement. Agreements differed slightly in the
timeframes for response and the individuals to
whom the clinical reviews were escalated.
(2) Clear communication protocols were introduced
about how the paging system should be used. These
ensured details were given about the patient’s identity,
what was required and how urgent the request was.
The model used was based on the ISBAR (Identify,
Situation, Background, Assessment, Request)
situational briefing tool [20,21].
(3) A revision of the education process for new
staff occurred in parallel with these other two
interventions. An inter-professional induction
program was developed that specifically addressed
the care of the deteriorating patient [22].(b) Intervention testing on the six wards
This was undertaken using a before and after analysis
of the incidence of all RRS activations, missed/delayed
RRS activations, and cardiac arrest calls on each of the
six wards. The primary endpoint for this study was the
incidence of missed/delayed RRS activations. The def-
inition of a missed/delayed RRS activation was that
the patient, in the 24 hours prior to either a RRS acti-
vation, cardiac arrest call, or admission to the critical
care unit, fulfilled the RRS activation criteria and that
the activation did not occur at that time. The activation cri-
teria are those that we have previously published [16].The
secondary endpoints were the incidence of RRS activations
and cardiac arrest calls.Post implementation data was collected for two pe-
riods, initially after implementation and at one year.
For each period, the incidence of the various end-
points was determined over a 10 week period, simul-
taneously across the six intervention wards by daily
examination of the cardiac arrest, and RRS team acti-
vation databases and review of the previous 24 hour’s
admissions to the critical care unit. The number of
bed days for each ward was obtained for each ward
from a centralized database. The second post observa-
tion period after one year was undertaken to allow for
adequate training and socialization of the interven-
tions. Minor changes were also made to the cognitive
aid that was provided with the clinical observation
sheet to help the clinical staff implement the changes.
To prevent confusion, the results of the immediate
post intervention phase have been omitted.Statistical analysis
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS statis-
tics version 20 (IBM). Pre- and Post-intervention data
on the rates of RRS activations, missed RRS activa-
tions, cardiac arrest calls and unplanned Intensive
Care Unit (ICU) admissions were compared using bin-
ary logistic regressions. A level of p < 0.05 was taken
as statistically significant.Results
The interventions selected for implementation were: a
ward based agreement on how to best locally optimize
management of the deteriorating patient; an improved
communication protocol; and a revision of the educa-
tion program for staff. Post intervention the aggregate
rate of missed/delayed RRS calls reduced across all
wards (1.05 to 0.34 per 1000 bed days, p = 0.049). This
occurred without a change in the rate of RRS activation
(7.98 per 1000 bed days pre-intervention versus 7.85
bed days post-intervention). The incidence of cardiac
arrests or unplanned interventions did not change post
intervention (Table 2).
34 North Abnormal Vital Signs Response Sheet
This form must be completed for all patients meeting MET call criteria (below)
Sign and time entries. Failure to follow this process is a reportable adverse event via Riskman
Time of meeting MET criteria………………on ……………(date)
PRIMARY NURSE
Within 30 mins you should either:
1) Call a MET call, OR
2) Call Nurse in charge / Resident
AND -Start treatment (eg. O2)




Within 30 mins you should either:
1) Call a MET call, or ICU OR
2) Call covering Resident or Registrar
AND -Start basic treatment (eg. O2)




Within 30 minutes you must:
1) See the patient yourself OR
2) Ask for a MET call





Within 4 hours you must see
the patient and either:
1) Call a MET call, OR
2) Call ICU if criteria persist





Respiratory distress  
Concern about airway 
Breathing
Respiratory rate > 30/min  
Respiratory rate < 6/min 
Sats < 90% on 02  
Circulation
Systolic BP < 90mmHg  
Heart Rate > 130bpm  
Neurology




If observations deteriorate a 
second time a MET call must 
be made Immediately
MET call made at (time) ………
30 mins from abnormal obs
1 hour from abnormal obs
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Main findings
This study found that the use of a ward initiated multi-
faceted intervention sustainably reduced the incidence of
missed RRS team activations that may result in either
unplanned ICU admission or cardiac arrest. This was
done without an increase in the number of RRS calls.
Taken together these two findings would suggest that
the bedside clinical staff can improve the utilization of the
RRS. A key finding is that the successful development of
co-produced, practice sensitive protocols for initiatingRRS can improve outcomes of patients experiencing de-
terioration without additional RRS resources.
Study limitations
There are several significant limitations to this study.
The most important limitation of this study is the defin-
ition of the term “missed/delayed RRS activation.” Tech-
nically a missed RRS call should include all patient
events where the activation criteria are broached and no
RRS call is made at that time. However, to accurately de-
termine this there would need to be either intense manual
Table 2 Rates of clinical incidents pre- and post- intervention
Ward 1 Ward 2 Ward 3 Ward 4 Ward 5 Ward 6 Total
Bed days
Pre-intervention 1226 2033 1021 3720 2166 1235 11401
Post-intervention 1321 1831 1101 3100 2415 2079 11847
RRS activations
(per 1000 bed days)
Pre-intervention 16 (13.10) 14 (6.89) 3 (2.94) 33 (8.87) 17 (7.85) 8 (6.48) 91 (7.98)
Post-intervention 18 (13.63) 19 (10.38) 6 (5.45) 22 (7.10) 20 (8.28) 8 (3.85) 93 (7.85)
(p = 0.899) (p = 0.239) (p = 0.381) (p = 0.416) (p = 0.870) (p = 0.296) (p = 0.910)
Cardiac Arrests
(per 1000 bed days)
Pre-intervention 3 (2.45) 2 (0.98) 0 (0) 4 (1.08) 1 (0.46) 0 (0) 10 (0.88)
Post-intervention 2 (1.51) 5 (2.73) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (0.59)
(p = 0.599) (p = 0.222) - (p = 0.984) (p = 0.987) - (p = 0.423)
Missed RRS activations
(per 1000 bed days)
Pre-intervention 3 (2.45) 2 (0.98) 0 (0) 4 (1.08) 3 (1.39) 0 (0) 12 (1.05)
Post-intervention 1 (0.76) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0.32) 1 (0.41) 1 (0.48) 4 (0.34)
(p = 0.309) (p = 0.988) - (p = 0.281) (p = 0.295) (p = 0.991) (p = 0.049)*
Unplanned ICU admissions
(per 1000 bed days)
Pre-intervention 6 (4.89) 5 (2.46) - - - 1 (0.81) 12 (2.67)
Post-intervention 5 (3.79) 2 (1.09) - 5 (1.61) 7 (2.90) 0 (0) 19 (1.77)
(p = 0.773) (p = 0.444) - - - (p = 0.987) (p = 0.264)
* = statistically significant.
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or an automated electronic observation capture system in
place. In the first scenario, intense manual observation is
likely to lead to skewing of findings by Hawthorne effect
and, in the second scenario, observation surveillance by
electronic observation capture systems are as yet not
widely utilised in the general ward setting. Our previous
study found using a snap shot methodology that 42% of all
potential RRS activations were in fact not made [10,11].
However, the importance of this is unclear, when the posi-
tive and negative predictive value of the various activation
criteria, are so low [12-15,23]. However, from a more prac-
tical standpoint, our organisation was principally con-
cerned with the missed/delayed RRS activation that was
associated with patient harm to such a degree that either
intensive care admission was required or, worse, that a
cardiac arrest occurred. As such, what mattered to us was
not so much that every potential RRS activation was
made, but that a culture existed on the wards to positively
encourage RRS activation when the patients were clearly
deteriorating.
There weresome other limitations to this study. First,
that this was a small study undertaken only in six wardsin a single organization. The ability to generalize these
findings across our organization and in other organiza-
tions has not been tested. Second, we do not know if
these changes will be sustained over time. We only did
an analysis of effectiveness twelve months after the inter-
vention had been implemented. Third, the incidence of
missed RRS both pre and post implementation was less
than we documented in our baseline point prevalence
study. This was due to the different definitions of “missed
RRS call” that were used and the different methodology
for collecting this data. Fourth, it is possible that the
changes we observed between the two data collection pe-
riods may have occurred due to a change in case mix of
the hospital population. However during this study period
there was no major change in the service delivery profile
of our hospitals or the population that accessed them.
Study significance
The fundamental construct of the RRS is that there
needs to be a set of rules based on physiological values
that determine the activation and response to certain
predefined criteria. These rules have been determined by
expert opinion and have not been validated [12].
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on the whole, the activation criteria have reasonable
negative predictive value. However, the adherence to
rules invariably has a poor positive predictive value gen-
erally due to low sensitivity of the criteria [12-15]. For
the clinician faced with using the RRS this translates to
a set of rules that mean the RRS must be called, but the
net result of that is that there is minimal to no interven-
tion and the patient does just fine sitting there in their
ward bed [23]. Junior clinicians repeatedly observe this
system with a low ‘signal to noise’ ratio leading to reluc-
tance to activate the RRS and perception that they can
manage these situations. This contrasts to the perspec-
tive of the RRS teams, the intensive care teams and units
and the hospital administrators. For these groups each
missed RRS, regardless of incidence that results in pa-
tient harm, is a major catastrophe. There is a perception
from these groups that the junior staff members were
unaware of the seriousness of the patient’s condition or
did not adequately record the clinical observations. The
usual response from administration to these situations is
to develop more policy and procedure to be handed
down to the workers in the real world of hospital medi-
cine at the bedside [24]. Additional policy and proce-
dures that conflict with the workflow and reduce
efficiency of the bedside clinical staff are most likely to
be ignored or at best, are followed inconsistently [24].
This is reflected in our experience, with a small but sig-
nificant incidence of patients that experienced harm as a
result of missed RRS calls remaining persistent. In our
view this approach has the risk of reinforcing beliefs
amongst bedside health care clinicians that they are per-
ceived as incapable and can’t manage their patients. In-
variably the staff does understand what is happening
with their patients who are clinically deteriorating. We
found in that study [10] that it was other cultural factors
that were at play that prevented appropriate and timely
clinical interventions for such patients. By taking the
problem to the actual staff on the ground to get them to
solve their own problems with their own resources, we
succeeded in our aim of the ward teams taking owner-
ship of the problem of deteriorating patients.Conclusion
We have described and demonstrated the benefits of a
bottom up intervention approach to a significant patient
problem in our organization. The use of this innovative
way to harness clinical expertise at the ward bedside level
within certain predefined boundaries has in our view im-
proved the utilization of the RRS in our organization.Competing interests
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